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Father Robert Drinan, long a leading advocate of human
rights, has had a distinguished career serving as a U.S.
congressman from Massachusetts, as Dean of the Boston College
Law School, and now as Professor of Law at Georgetown
University Law Center. Father Drinan's new book, Can God and
Caesar Coexist?: Balancing Religious Freedom and International
Law,1 sensitively and persuasively sets out the often tortuous
relations among religion (the "God" of his title), national
governments ("Caesar"), and international law (the new and
possibly helpful partner in this relationship).
My essay employs the facts and arguments in Father
Drinan's Can God and Caesar Coexist? as a sounding board for a
single, central observation. In the oftentimes dysfunctional
family of faith, the state, and international law, it is
international law that is very much the weak sister, doomed to
play a humble and subservient role vis-A-vis the much more
powerful figures of religion and the sovereign state. I think
Father Drinan and I agree that it will be extraordinarily difficult
for international law, the Cinderella of the tale, to rise up to
engage either faith or the state on anything like an even playing
field.
The question of Father Drinan's immediate interest is
religious tolerance. He sets the problem out clearly: "The most
important question relates to an ancient issue: whether a nation
should or can establish one religion as the official faith of the
country. Will world law someday hold that, for the sake of
t William F. Starr Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law.
A.B., Princeton University; M.A., Oxford University; J.D., Harvard Law School.
I ROBERT F. DRINAN, S.J., CAN GOD AND CAESAR COEXIST?: BALANCING
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2004).
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maximizing religious freedom, no nation can formally exalt one
religious faith over any other?"2
Belief in religion and belief in the sovereign state are two of
the strongest human emotional attachments. What hope does
international law have to limit the assertions of either faith or
the state? Even more daunting, what realistic hope does
international law have to moderate claims made jointly by
religion and national government, claims made with the
awesome combined authority of both? Should or can
international law, for example, in the name of religious freedom
or religious tolerance, limit the acts of nationally dominant
religions when they act through national governments to restrict
or prohibit the activities of other religious faiths? Realistically,
ought international law be expected to be a protector of minority
religious beliefs and practices in states where the dominant
religion and the ruling secular authority agree that other
religious beliefs should be kept out or at least significantly
restricted?
As I set out answers to such questions, I will move along a
somewhat different trajectory than that of Father Drinan but
will always stand on the foundation of his work. My starting
place is to ask: What is "international law?" Elsewhere I have
tried to look at religion through the eyes of international law,
concluding that "religion and morality, once proof for Grotius,
problem for Vattel, sanction for Wheaton, history for Oppenheim,
have become for Brownlie anathema."3  However, I have not
before attempted to look at international law through the eyes of
religion. Using Father Drinan as my first example, let me try to
do so now. In doing so, I will also set out the key parts of Father
Drinan's analysis.
I. A VISION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
What does Father Drinan think international law is? The
answer is a little complex. In general, Father Drinan identifies
international law as a law that is universal. He sometimes calls
this universal law by different, but equivalent terms. His two
most important terms are "international law" and "world law."
2 Id. at 9.
3 Mark W. Janis, Religion and the Literature of International Law: Some
Standard Texts, in RELIGION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 121, 140 (Mark W. Janis &
Carolyn Evans eds., 2004).
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The book's title, of course, refers to "balancing religious freedom
and international law" and Father Drinan's first paragraph
explains that "the right to religious liberty ... is so foundational
and precious that it should be guaranteed by international
law[.]" 4 Throughout the book the term "international law" seems
to signal the discipline in general. In looking in Chapter 2 at the
problems that this universal law might have for states, Father
Drinan writes, "Will international law someday require the
Republic of Ireland to delete from its laws the provisions that
establish Catholicism as the stated faith of the entire country?"5
When viewing the foreign policy position and activities of the
United States in Chapter 4, he asks, "Does international law
require that sovereign nations admit missionaries when it is
known that they will proselytize and seek to inculcate beliefs
that the host nation considers alien to or even subversive of its
culture?"6 In describing in Chapter 6 the developments that led
to the liberalized approach of Vatican II towards religious
freedom, Father Drinan argues that "the thrust of international
law in this area should be to extend the guarantees of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the covenants on
political rights to religion in all its forms." 7
The other prevalent general term used for this universal law
in Father Drinan's book is "world law." This term appears much
less frequently than "international law," but when used, "world
law" is apparently interchangeable with "international law." In
Chapter 1, when speaking of the 1993 U.N. World Conference on
Human Rights in Vienna, Father Drinan notes that the 172
nations participating at the Conference "repeated and reinforced
the proclamations of world law in favor of religious freedom." In
Chapter 2, he asks, "What will be the consequences of this new
world law granting the freedom to act on one's 'conscience,
religion or belief?"9  In Chapter 4, immediately after using
"international law" in discussing American foreign policy, he
asks, "Do Christians from the United States have a right under
world law to set up churches in non-Christian countries and seek
4 DRINAN, supra note 1, at 1.
Id. at 9.
6 Id. at 65.
7 Id. at 109.
s Id. at 6.
9 Id. at 22.
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to change their cultures?"10  In his account of government
repression of religion in Chapter 9, Father Drinan states that
"[r]ights of all kinds guaranteed by world law were violated in El
Salvador."11  Also, note a key section title in the concluding
chapter, Chapter 13: "Can There Be a World Law Regulating
Religious Freedom?" 12
Two other general terms equivalent to "international law"
and "world law" appear, albeit only on occasion. One is "global
law," most prominently using "global" as an adjective. For
example, the title of Chapter 1 is "A New Global Right: Religious
Freedom."13  Arguably, Father Drinan could equally have
denominated the chapter "A New International Legal Right:
Religious Freedom" or "A New Right in World Law: Religious
Freedom." Another term equivalent to "international law" and
"world law" is the unadorned use of the word "law." For example,
in discussing the United Nations and religion in Chapter 3,
Father Drinan writes that "[t]he law stands in near awe of a
person who adopts a religious idea as his 'conception of life.' "14
Father Drinan's general concept, whether styled
"international law," "world law," "global law," or simply "law,"
seems to encompass universal rules applicable, at least in theory,
to all states. International law might, then, be said to be
differentiated from the law of a state in that it is a law for the
many states rather than a law for a single state. So far, at least,
this seems to be a fair description of international law from
either an ordinary positivistic or naturalistic point of view. Both
agree that there is such a thing as international law. Both part
with narrow Austinian positivism's rejection of international law
as not law but mere morality. 15
Assuming then that Father Drinan accepts the discipline of
international law as law, how does he fall on the spectrum of
positivism versus naturalism? The key difference between them
in this respect may be said to pertain to the sources of authority
of international law. Positivism draws authority from the
consent of sovereign states. Naturalism, while usually accepting
10 Id. at 65.
11 Id. at 153.
12 Id. at 212.
13 Id. at 1.
14 Id. at 39.
15 See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 208 (1st
ed. 1832).
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that sovereign states can make international law by consent, also
believes that international law can spring from natural sources
beyond state sovereignty. 16 Interestingly, Father Drinan mostly
departs from the naturalistic tradition of much important
Catholic thought and adopts a more-or-less positivistic approach
to international law. 17 As I explain below, he seems to do so as a
result of skepticism about the realities of enforcing international
law.
Respecting sources, Father Drinan's book is replete with
references to treaties, pacts, and covenants, the most secure form
of international law for those of a positivistic persuasion. Indeed,
the relative importance of treaties for him is emphasized early on
in Chapter 1:
The uncertainty around the world concerning the extent to
which governments should guarantee religious freedom is one of
the major reasons why the United Nations has not pursued a
covenant or a legally binding instrument on freedom of religion,
as it has done with respect to such issues as the rights of
minorities, women, and children.18
While others will disagree here and maintain that freedom of
religion is already protected by treaty law, most notably in
Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 19 for our purposes it is sufficient to note that Father
Drinan distinguishes treaties as that form of international law
which constitutes "a legally binding instrument." He thus
implies that other forms of international law may not be legally
binding or perhaps not so legally binding. A similar distinction
appears in Chapter 3 in his discussion of the United Nations:
"The difficulties inherent in drafting any worldwide resolution on
religious freedom caused delays, but in 1981 the United Nations
Commission on Human Rights finally completed a declaration
(but not a covenant) on religious freedom."20 Most tellingly, he
16 See MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAw 1-4, 59-67
(4th ed. 2003).
17 For an overview of the naturalistic tradition, see Josef L. Kunz, Editorial
Comment, Natural-Law Thinking in the Modern Science of International Law, 55
AM. J. INT'L L. 951, 951 (1961).
is DRINAN, supra note 1, at 3.
19 See Michael J. Perry, A Right to Religious Freedom? The Universality of
Human Rights, The Relativity of Culture, 10 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 385, 395-
400 (2005).
20 DRINAN, supra note 1, at 38.
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comments, "However, it does not seem likely that any movement
in the foreseeable future will induce the United Nations to put
forward a covenant on religious freedom to elevate the
aspirations listed in the Declaration on Religious Freedom into a
binding contract."21 So, Father Drinan appears to divide
international law into two kinds of sources: treaties which are
legally binding and other norms which are something else.
What are those other norms? Father Drinan does refer to
customary international law, but much less often than might be
expected. His first reference to it may indicate that he views
customary international law as another way of expressing
international law in general. In Chapter 1, he writes:
One would like to think that wars inspired by religious zeal
were safely in the past. Clearly they are now forbidden by
customary international law; after all, the 191 nations that
have ratified the United Nations covenants on political and
economic rights have solemnly pledged to refrain from such
wars.
22
Another indication of the same, such as conflating customary
international law with international law in general, is to be
found in Chapter 2: "Many may feel that any treatment of the
evolution of the freedom of religion into a right enshrined in
customary international law should not complicate the story by
remarking on the international law of human rights that
embraces the aspirations of conscience. But the two stories are
inseparable." 23  Father Drinan's infrequent and perhaps
ambiguous use of customary international law means that he
gives little play to a source often seen as a halfway house
between consent-based positivists and the less state-centered
naturalists. It could be that this is, indeed, a wise choice. For
my part, I have sometimes argued that the implicit consent of
customary international law, often called the opino juris, is more
a judge- or jurist-made glue to make an international legal rule
stick than it is cement actually applied by consenting states. 24
For his part, Father Drinan devotes substantially more
attention to proclamations, declarations, and doctrines as sources
for what he seems to feel is the less binding side of international
21 Id. at 43.
22 Id. at 2.
23 Id. at 16.
24 See JANIS, supra note 16, at 41-55.
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law. We have already seen some examples above where he
contrasts the binding law of treaties to the non-legally obliging
rules drawn from other sources. Throughout the book, he
stresses that states today are unlikely to feel bound by non-
treaty sources. For example, in Chapter 2:
Many religious groups will be very reluctant even to consider
that the place of religion in a nation such as Norway, Nigeria, or
Pakistan should be determined by the norms set forth in 1981
in the United Nations Declaration on Religious Freedom. Most
of the world's nations would agree, at least in theory, that
Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights could
govern freedom of the press everywhere in the world; this
freedom is nearly universally accepted. But when it comes to
religious freedom, it is clear that the nations where a religion is
a part of the entrenched establishment will not so readily accept
outside authorities. Furthermore, in nations with a long-
standing relationship between government and religion, many
will claim that any weakening of the hegemony of the
traditional religious belief would threaten the morality and
well-being of the country.25
As noted above, Father Drinan argues that the failure of the
international community to draft and implement a meaningful
treaty protecting religious freedom and promoting religious
tolerance is due to a widespread unwillingness of both states and
religions to accept legally binding limits on established national
religions. Hence, Father Drinan emphasizes the significance of
the dividing line between legally binding treaties and non-legally
binding declarations, proclamations, and opinions. Both, in his
view, are international or world law, but only treaties are viewed
as possibly legally binding on states.
An expression of this incongruity between the two forms of
international law is given in this account of the Islamic nations:
Will the exaltation of religious freedom now so clear in
international law eventually require Islamic countries to cease
to base their civil laws on the Koran, even though the vast
majority of their citizens have inherited and presumably accept
the Muslim faith? International law has hardly commenced the
tricky task of balancing the right of nations to prefer the faith of
the majority against the claims of citizens in the religious
25 DRINAN, supra note 1, at 11.
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minority who feel that they have, by law, been relegated to
second-class citizenship. 26
When describing the sources of "the exaltation of religious
freedom now so clear in international law," Father Drinan
chooses not to employ the "softest" of all sources, those relating to
fundamental norms or natural law. His account of the legally
non-binding, more-or-less merely persuasive sources of
international law emphasizes only state-generated evidence,
such as declarations and proclamations. Other international
lawyers, however, especially international human rights lawyers,
often turn to notions of jus cogens, peremptory norms,
fundamental principles, and the like when they seek to
demonstrate new rules of international law.2 7 This is all in the
tradition of natural law, a tradition often associated with the
Roman Catholic heritage and with many Catholic international
lawyers since at least Suar6z and Vitoria in the sixteenth
century. Father Drinan's approach to international law, leaving
out these fundamental norms, puts him on the positivistic side of
the positivism-naturalism divide.
Moreover, Father Drinan gives little attention to general
principles of law. The concept of general principles of law, like
that of customary international law, is one of the usual
compromise categories of international law sources between
naturalism and positivism; it is the notion that certain rules exist
in so many legal systems so as to be presumed to exist in all or
most legal systems. As gap-fillers, general principles are
acceptable to some positivists because, like customary
international law, general principles are presumed to have the
implicit consent of states. They are welcomed by naturalists
since they help add basic norms to international law beyond
those to which states explicitly consent.28 If Father Drinan had
emphasized either or both fundamental norms or general
principles of law as sources of international law, it is likely that
he would have put them on the "soft" non-obligatory side of his
division of international law, no more, and perhaps even less,
legally binding than the declarations and proclamations of states.
But how effective are even the legally binding international
obligations of states? Throughout his book, Father Drinan
26 Id. at 9-10.
27 See JANIS, supra note 16, at 59-67.
28 See id. at 55-59.
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apparently pins his principal hope for an effective legal regime on
some sort of a world court devoted to the protection of religious
freedom. In the first chapter, he complains that heretofore the
United Nations "has never considered establishing a world entity
to monitor compliance with the demands of religious freedom."29
A few pages later, he admits that "[tihe idea of creating some sort
of international legal machinery to resolve clashes between these
religious groups may seem quixotic."30 He fears that "[t]he idea
of creating a world tribunal that would guarantee the free
exercise of religion will elicit a strong reaction from both
believers and nonbelievers." 31  He writes, "The feeling is
somehow pervasive that government organizations-or even a
transnational legal body-should not get involved in the religious
practices of 84 percent of the human race." 32 Nonetheless, Father
Drinan argues in Chapter 3 that "[tlhe hope and even the
expectation of those involved in the revolution of expectations
brought on by the United Nations era of human rights is the
establishment of a world court to which persons victimized by
religious zealots or by nations hostile to religion can appeal for
justice."33
What is such a world tribunal protecting religious freedom to
look like? Father Drinan is nowhere very clear as to his own
vision. He asks, "Is it possible that the United Nations Human
Rights Committee will in due course become a tribunal where
individuals and religious organizations can obtain relief from a
denial of their religious rights?"34  Perhaps. He deems the
Committee "a sleeping giant; if the appropriate case were
presented, it could issue a ruling that would raise religious
freedom to a height not yet attained in world law." 35 Yet, he does
not explain why a mere ruling of the United Nations Human
Rights Committee would be treated as binding law.
So far, he believes the most effective forces "operating to
make the United Nations and other global entities more
proactive in protecting human rights, particularly religious
freedom.., are mostly nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
29 DRINAN, supra note 1, at 3.
30 Id. at 5.
31 Id. at 6.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 47.
34 Id. at 36-37.
35 Id. at 37.
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that were created to protect the rights of such groups as the
Christians in southern Sudan and the Kurds." 36 Though "[t]hese
NGOs have broad constituencies,... there is as yet no worldwide
network of organizations united in their efforts to protect the
religious freedom of a wide variety of religious nonconformists,
dissidents, and conscientious objectors." 37
Why not? Father Drinan puts the central problem down to
the unwillingness of states to permit any international
institution, even a worldwide network of NGOs, to participate in
national regulation and promotion of religion. This unwilling-
ness encompasses many key governments. For example, and
perhaps controversially, he writes that "[i]t may not be helpful to
say that one particular country has the worst record on religious
freedom in the world. If we undertook to assign that label,
however, and possibly overlooked Sudan, the People's Republic of
China would have an almost unchallenged claim to that
distinction."38 China, he is distressed to say, "openly rejects the
right to the free exercise of religion."39 The reason? "Although
faith in an unseen god is mysterious and sometimes frightening
for everyone, China sees it as a grave threat... ."40 He fears that
the "adamantly antireligious policies of Beijing may not be
resolved for some time."41
Not surprisingly, Father Drinan finds the Islamic countries
almost equally hostile to the possible intervention of inter-
national machinery to protect religious freedom. "[O]ne has to
wonder if any worldwide juridical authority could define and
apply international principles of religious freedom to the Muslim
world; or, more pointedly, if the rulings of such a tribunal could
ever win acceptance in the world of Islam-some fifty nations
and 1.2 billion adherents."42
Father Drinan's vision of international law thus may be said
to be both positivistic and idealistic. As for positivism, he prefers
the more black-letter possibilities of the discipline: treaty law
rather than law drawn from custom, general principles, or
natural law. He is inclined to that part of international law
36 Id. at 12.
37 Id. at 12-13.
38 Id. at 165.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 177.
41 Id. at 179.
42 Id. at 181.
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which is based on the posited consensual agreements of
governments. As for idealism, Father Drinan hopes not only that
governments will explicitly protect religious freedoms in
international agreements but also that they will live up to their
agreements. The means to do so, he suggests, should be the
establishment of an international court charged to enforce
religious tolerance against the practices of sovereign states.
II. THE VISION IN PRACTICE
What are the prospects for such a positivistic, yet idealistic,
vision of international law? It might be argued that this is just
the right time to create a new international tribunal to protect
religious freedom. After all, since World War II, a great many
international law courts and dispute settlement mechanisms
have been constituted. To mention just a few, there are the
International Court of Justice, 43 the European Court of Justice
and the Court of First Instance, 44 the European Court of Human
Rights, 45 the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea,46 the
WTO Dispute Settlement System, 47 and the International
Criminal Court.48 Indeed, a recent book devoted to conflicts, real
and potential, among international courts and tribunals listed
eighteen functioning international courts and tribunals-the six
above and a dozen more!49
Why not a nineteenth international court or tribunal devoted
to the protection of religious freedom? Reluctantly, I conclude
that the prospects are, in my opinion, bleak. Speaking as an
international lawyer, my guess is that Father Drinan's vision
faces a tough test in the field of religious freedom. His may be a
vision better suited to fields of international relations less
43 See JANIS, supra note 16, at 125-57 (describing the roles, the reform, and the
proliferation of international courts).
44 See PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BURCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND
MATERIALS 86-102 (3d ed. 2003).
45 See MARK W. JANIS ET AL., EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: TEXT AND
MATERIALS 27-92 (2d ed. 2000).
46 See LOUIS B. SOHN & JOHN E. NOYES, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF
THE SEA 825-53 (2004).
47 See JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS 246-337 (4th ed. 2002).
48 See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT (2001).
49 See YUvAL SHANY, THE COMPETING JURISDICTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 1-11 (2003).
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confrontational than the one concerning religious tolerance,
particularly to fields that are more economic and less emotional.
In the real world of international affairs, issues concerning trade
and investment are the ones most prone in practice to be
effectively governed by black-letter legal rules and actually
determined by the ordinary legal processes of courts and arbitral
tribunals. This is a centuries-old phenomenon of international
law. It accounts, among other things, for the fact that today, the
lion's share of practicing international lawyers are engaged in
one or another form of international economic law: international
sales, international finance, international trade, international
business, international investment, international tax, and so on.
The "friendliness" of international economic transactions to
international law and international process is due to many
causes, but central among them is the fact that the
consummation of international economic transactions generally
on balance benefits both sides in the long run. Hence, the
regularities of black-letter law and effective legal process are
perceived by most participants as beneficial, since, whatever the
short-term costs of the authoritative application of legal rules
and process, the long-term benefits of rule compliance is greater.
The utility and employment of international law,
international courts, and international lawyers are notably less
in other areas of international affairs. In matters of war and
peace, for example, international law and international legal
process are notoriously ineffectual. War may sometimes be too
important to be left to the generals, but it may also be too
important to be left to the lawyers. Hence, in matters concerning
the use of force, international rules are often breached, and
international courts are almost never employed.
I have argued before that the affinity of international
problems to be addressed effectively by international law and
legal process varies on a spectrum of efficacy. 50 The efficacy
spectrum varies from a relatively "friendly" area like
international economic transactions to a relatively "unfriendly"
area like international military conflict. Where on the
international legal spectrum of efficacy does Father Drinan's
field, international religious freedom, fall?
50 See JANIS, supra note 16, at 159-85; Mark W. Janis, Do 'Laws' Regulate
Nuclear Weapons?, in NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 53, 59-61
(Istvan Pogany ed., 1987).
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Sadly, I am afraid that the protection of religious freedom
falls towards the "unfriendly" end of the efficacy spectrum of
international law. Indeed, Father Drinan's book is itself good
evidence for this conclusion. Too many countries-he mentions
so many-are too deeply committed to certain religious
preferences to make international legal decisions about the
practice of religion easy to apply or to be made efficacious.
Especially difficult are questions about the place of minority
religions in countries where church and state are united in a
conviction that the majority religion is the only true path of
religious belief. In practice, religious tolerance is not a field
where most players would gain most of the time were the domain
to be regularized by international rules and international
adjudication. A nationally dominant religion is unlikely to let its
predominance be challenged by minority and especially foreign
faiths. Moreover, from the standpoint of a national government,
foreign-supported efforts to proselytize within national territory
are likely to be viewed as affronts to national sovereignty.
In practice, I cannot understand why many states would be
willing to permit an international body, much less an
international court, to review national religious practices. The
practice of religion is simply taken too seriously by too many
states to induce them to yield any sort of sovereign authority to
an international group to evaluate authoritatively national
religious tolerance. I think it would be highly unlikely, for
example to name just a few, for countries as different as the
United States, Ireland, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and China to agree
to submit disputes about the practice of religion or religious
tolerance to a panel of international judges or arbitrators in the
way they submit disputes about trade or investment. Moreover,
even if some governments were to contemplate such a measure, I
think it virtually certain that organized dominant religions,
whatever or wherever they may they be, would be unlikely to be
willing to cede review of their dominant positions to any sort of
international legal or judicial review and control.
Even in Europe where the European Court of Human Rights
has made such progress in providing an international
supervisory mechanism to protect human rights,51 the
Strasbourg Court has been slow and relatively reluctant to
51 See JANIS ET AL., supra note 45, 64-92.
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enforce Article 9 of the 1950 European Convention on Human
Rights. It was not until 1993 in Kokkinakis v. Greece52 that the
Strasbourg Court first applied Article 9 against a state. This
came well after it had enforced all of the other substantive
freedoms protected by the Convention. And, despite the
occasional ruling against a state for the blatant violation of
freedom of religion,53 the Strasbourg Court has given states a
wide margin of appreciation in restricting the free exercise of
religion.54 Thus, even the relatively powerful and well-accepted
European Court of Human Rights finds the protection of religious
freedom a hot topic, many times too hot to touch.
This, I know, will be a pessimistic opinion for Father Drinan,
and I would be glad to be buoyed by a more optimistic
assessment. However, I think it a fair reading of Can God and
Caesar Coexist? to conclude that international law and legal
process is the Cinderella to the combined authority of dominant
faiths and states, Father Drinan's gods and Caesars. Faced with
the powerful emotional appeals of religion and nationalism,
international law is likely to be the weak and humble sister.
52 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 397 (1993).
53 See, e.g., Buscarini v. San Marino, 1999-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 605, 619.
54 See, e.g., Murphy v. Ireland, 2003-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 31; Refah Partisi
(Welfare Party) v. Turkey, 2003-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 267, 301-03; Otto-Preminger
Inst. v. Austria, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. 34, 47-48 (1995).
